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Abstract
This paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors. Investors choose the
composition of their information subject to an information ﬂow constraint. Given their
expected investment strategy in the next period, which is to hold a diversiﬁed portfolio, in
equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoﬀsa sap r i v a t e
signal. When investors use this private signal to update information about two assets,
changes in one asset aﬀect both asset prices and may lead to asset price comovement. The
model also has implications for the transmission of volatility shocks between two assets.
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Many empirical ﬁndings in economics and ﬁnance have been explained by assuming a particular
information structure. In recent years, there is a growing literature that lets agents choose
the information structure,1 usually under some restrictions on its composition. In ﬁnance
models, for example, investors are typically restricted to collect information about individual
assets. However, in practice, information is also available about portfolios of assets. This
paper studies a model in which investors can collect information about combinations of assets.
This paper presents a multiple asset, noisy rational expectations model with rationally
inattentive agents that builds on Admati [1], Peng and Xiong [20] and Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp [25,26]. The framework consists of two uncorrelated risky assets and a continuum
of agents who face information processing constraints as in Sims [22,23]. Investors process
information about the assets to reduce uncertainty about their portfolio. Investors process
information in prices for free, have limited capacity to process additional information, and
decide how to use this capacity. In particular, investors can choose between processing infor-
mation about individual asset payoﬀs or linear combinations of asset payoﬀs. The information
processing decision is formalized as choosing noisy signals about linear combinations of asset
payoﬀs. After allocating their attention, investors incorporate the information from their pri-
vate signals and from prices through Bayesian updating to form their posterior beliefs about
the asset payoﬀs and then choose their optimal asset holdings.
This paper represents a step forward towards introducing rational inattention, introduced
by Sims [22,23], in a general equilibrium ﬁnance model. Peng [19], Peng and Xiong [20] and
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [25,26] are the ﬁrst attempts at introducing information ca-
pacity constraints into ﬁnance. In these models, if assets are assumed to be independent, then
investors can process information only about individual assets because the ex-post variance-
covariance matrix of the payoﬀs is constrained to be diagonal. In other words, in their ap-
proach, sources of uncertainty that are ex-ante independent remain independent ex-post.
In contrast, I solve for the optimal form of the ex-post variance-covariance matrix of the
1See Hellwig and Veldkamp [7], Luo [15], Mackowiak and Wiederholt [16,17], Peng [19], Peng and Xiong [20]
and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [25,26].
1payoﬀs, which is not initially constrained to be diagonal. Investors can get signals about
any linear combination of asset payoﬀs. They are able to choose the composition of their
information, i.e., investors decide if they want to observe a private signal about each asset
payoﬀ or about a linear combination of asset payoﬀs. Given their expected investment strategy
in the next period, which is to hold a diversiﬁed portfolio, there is an equilibrium where all
investors choose to observe a linear combination of asset payoﬀs as a private signal. This result
is at the heart of the present paper. This result is consistent with the evidence provided by
Hameed, Morck, Shen and Yeung [6]. They ﬁnd that analysts follow assets that contain more
valuable market and industry wide information, suggesting that investors use the information
about some assets not only to trade in that asset, but also to value other assets. In other
words, Hameed, Morck, Shen and Yeung [6] show that, in line with the central prediction of
the present paper, investors choose to observe signals that are good predictors of many assets.
This model has implications for excess comovement in asset prices of seemingly unrelated
assets. Excess comovement is deﬁned as a high covariance of asset prices, relative to the
covariance of their fundamentals. Excess comovement of asset prices aﬀects the beneﬁts of
portfolio diversiﬁcation and is, therefore, an important issue in economics and ﬁnance.2 This
paper demonstrates that asset price comovement can be explained by rationally inattentive
investors choosing to observe a linear combination of two uncorrelated asset payoﬀs. Intu-
itively, if there is good news about one asset, then investors observe a high realization of the
private signal and they attribute part of the eﬀect to one asset and the rest to the other
asset. This leads to an increase in the price of both assets and, therefore, price comovement
of uncorrelated assets. A numerical example with reasonable parameters for the U.S. stock
market can generate an excess price correlation relative to fundamentals between 10.4% and
23.6% depending on the magnitude of the information processing capacity. These numbers
are close to the average excess correlation of 25.5% between the index returns of all major
industry groups in the U.S. stock market reported by Kallberg and Pasquariello [8].
2There is a large literature showing the existence of excess comovement of asset prices relative to the
comovement of their fundamentals (i) when there are announcements of common information content, (ii)
when there are announcements of unrelated news, and (iii) during non-announcement periods. See Pindyck
and Rotemberg [21], Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler [2] and Greenwood [5].
2Although other complementary channels are important for shedding light on asset price
comovement, this paper studies a new mechanism: because investors choose to observe a
linear combination of two uncorrelated asset payoﬀs as a private signal, changes in one asset
are reﬂected in the information about the two assets and investors attribute part of the eﬀect
to one asset and the remaining to the other asset. Thus, provided investors have a limited
capacity to process information, comovement between two uncorrelated assets arises even in
the absence of correlated liquidity shocks (Calvo [3]), wealth eﬀects (Kyle and Xiong [14]),
direct or indirect macroeconomic links (King and Wadhwani [10], Kodres and Pritsker [13]),
borrowing constraints (Yuan [29]) and endogenous information supply (Veldkamp [27]).
Empirically, it is diﬃcult to distinguish between these diﬀerent channels that potentially
generate comovement. Nevertheless, this model has unique implications for the transmission of
volatility shocks that distinguishes its mechanism from those of the alternative explanations.
In my model, if there is an unexpected event that increases uncertainty about one asset,
investors optimally allocate more attention to this asset, and therefore less attention to other
assets. As a result, investors perceive these other assets to be riskier, and so my model predicts
that the prices of these other stocks decline.
The evidence presented in Corwin and Coughenour [4] provides strong support for the
implications of the model. They measure the attention allocated by a NYSE specialist to each
asset, constructing a proxy for attention allocation based on the number of transactions and
the absolute return during a given trading period. They ﬁnd that when specialists increase
the attention allocated to their most active stocks, there is an increase in the bid-ask spread
of their remaining assigned stocks. This ﬁnding suggests that (i) the information processing
constraint is binding, even for professional investors, and (ii) an increase in the attention
allocated to a group of assets generates an increase in the perceived volatility of the other
assets assigned to the same specialist.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model with
special emphasis on rationally inattentive agents and information theory. Section 3 solves the
investor’s optimization problem. Section 4 examines price comovement between uncorrelated
3assets. Section 5 discusses the transmission of volatility shocks. Section 6 provides a numerical
example with parameters chosen to reasonably match yearly asset price moments for the U.S.
stock market. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix provides technical derivations and proofs.
2M o d e l d e s c r i p t i o n
There are two risky assets and a continuum of agents of measure one. Agents live three periods
and are endowed with an initial wealth and a limited capacity to process information. In the
ﬁrst period, investors choose their private signal. In the second period, each investor decides
on the optimal portfolio given the observation of a private signal and the price. In the last
period, agents consume the payoﬀ of their portfolio.
Each agent invests her initial endowment in three diﬀerent assets: a risk free asset that pays
Rf units of the consumption good and two uncorrelated risky assets. The ﬁr s tr i s k ya s s e tp a y s










units of the consumption good. Let ¯ R and ΣR denote the mean vector and the diagonal
variance-covariance matrix of the vector ˜ R =( ˜ r1, ˜ r2)0. The numeraire in the market is the
price of the bond and ˜ P =(˜ p1, ˜ p2)0 is the price vector of the risky assets. The net supply of the





,w h e r e¯ zj > 0 for
any risky asset j.L e t¯ Z and ΣZ denote the mean vector and the diagonal variance-covariance
matrix of the vector of net supply ˜ Z =( ˜ z1, ˜ z2)0. The vector of net supply, ˜ Z, is independent
of the vector of asset payoﬀs, ˜ R. Asset supply randomness can be viewed as the result of some
trade of a nonspeculative nature (liquidity traders) or some trade from agents lacking perfect
knowledge of the market structure (irrational traders). This randomness is necessary in order
to avoid perfect revelation of private information through the price.
2.1 Information theory
Investors face a constraint that limits the amount of information they can process. I will
refer to this constraint as the information processing constraint. Intuitively, there is a large
amount of information freely available relevant for decision making, but it takes time and
4mental attention for investors to incorporate this information into their decisions.
Following Sims [22,23], I use concepts from information theory to quantify the amount
of information that a private signal contains about the asset payoﬀs. Information theory
measures the rate of information ﬂow as the rate of uncertainty reduction. Entropy is the
measure of uncertainty used to calculate the information ﬂow. This measure of uncertainty
can be derived from four reasonable axioms, see Khinchin [9]. The entropy H (X) of a random
variable X with a continuous probability density p(x) is deﬁned as
H (X)=−E ln[p(X)] = −
Z
p(x)lnp(x) dx





where |Σ| is the determinant of Σ. Intuitively, for a Gaussian distributed variable, higher
uncertainty is associated with higher variance.
According to information theory, the amount of information that a random variable con-
tains about another random variable is measured as uncertainty reduction. This measure of
uncertainty reduction is called mutual information. Consider two random variables X and Y
with a joint density function p(x,y) and marginal density functions p(x) and p(y). Mutual






dxdy = H(X) − H(X | Y )
The amount of information that a random variable contains about another random variable
is quantiﬁed as the diﬀerence between unconditional uncertainty and conditional uncertainty.
Mutual information is invariant to any linear transformations of both random variables X
and Y
I(X;Y )=I(aX + b;cY + d)
5This measure is independent of the scale of the underlying variables, unlike other measures of
information such as the precision of the error in the private signal in Verrechia [28]. Given a
limited information processing capacity, κ,3 which is the maximum rate at which agents can
process information, the information processing constraint can be expressed as
I(X;Y )=H (X) − H (X | Y ) ≤ κ
The information processing constraint limits the information ﬂow by introducing an upper
bound to the mutual information. Intuitively, this constraint restricts the amount of informa-
tion contained in Y about X.
2.2 Investors’ information processing constraint
Investors want to obtain information about the risky assets in order to reduce the uncertainty
of their optimal portfolio. However, agents have a limited capacity to process information
about asset payoﬀs, which can be interpreted as limited time or mental attention. Investors
face an information processing constraint as in Sims [22,23]. Agents optimally decide how much
information they want to process about each asset given their limited information processing
capacity and choose the form of the private signal through which they process this information.
Agents are not allowed to process information about the net asset supply. In other words, the
cost of processing information about the net asset supply is inﬁnite.
I assume investor i is constrained to choose a signal of the following form
˜ Yi = Ci ˜ R +˜ εi where ˜ εi ∼ N(0,Σi) (1)
where Ci is any 2×2 matrix, ˜ εi is independent of ˜ R,a n dΣi is the variance-covariance matrix
of ˜ εi. The private signal provides information about linear combinations of asset payoﬀs. The
precision of a signal is higher if more attention is allocated to that particular signal. The
3The information processing capacity is the infomation ﬂow measure used in, among other things, char-
acterizing modems or internet connections. An advantage of this measure of information is that there is no
need to characterize the physical nature of the channel (wires, optical cables, human brain) through which the
information is sent, it is enough to specify the capacity of the channel, κ.
6private signals are incorporated into the investor’s beliefs through rational Bayesian updating.
Investors optimally solve for the form of the conditional variance-covariance matrix of the
payoﬀsb yc h o o s i n gCi and Σi subject to the information processing constraint. Note that the
conditional variance-covariance matrix of the payoﬀs is not constrained to be diagonal.
All investors have the same level of limited capacity to process information κ,w h i c hi s
assumed to be a strictly positive and ﬁnite parameter. For tractability reasons, they are as-
sumed to process information about prices for free.4 Investors choose an optimal private signal








˜ R | ˜ Yi
´
≤ κ
w h i c hi sw r i t t e na si nP e n g[ 1 9 ]a n dP e n ga n dX i o n g[ 2 0 ] . 5 Assuming Gaussian distributions
for the asset payoﬀs and the private signals, the information processing constraint can be
rewritten as
ln
¯ ¯ ¯Va r( ˜ R)
¯ ¯ ¯ − ln
¯ ¯ ¯Va r
³
˜ R | ˜ Yi
´¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 2κ (2)
The information processing constraint restricts the information ﬂow or, in other words,
the amount of information about the asset payoﬀs contained in the private signal.
2.3 Investors’ objective function













| ˜ Yi, ˜ P
¸¾
(3)
4See Mackowiak and Wiederholt [17] for a model where rationally inattentive agents do not perfectly observe
prices.
5In Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [26], the information processing constraint restricts the mutual infor-
mation between the asset payoﬀs, and prices and private information signals. All the results of the paper are
robust to the information constraint used in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [26] as shown in the additional
appendix.
7where W0
i is the wealth of agent i in the last period.6 The constant risk tolerance parameter ρ is
a s s u m e dt ob es t r i c t l yp o s i t i v ea n dﬁnite. Following Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [25,26],
I assume that investors have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, as in Kreps and

















i | ˜ Yi, ˜ P
i¶
(4)
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [25] discuss this objective function in detail. One justiﬁ-
cation for these preferences is that there is an unmodeled intertemporal consumption choice.
If investors had to choose their optimal consumption each period and they had a standard
expected utility, then they would have a desire for early resolution of uncertainty as suggested
by Spence and Zeckhauser [24]. Here the intertemporal consumption decision is not modeled
because it unnecessarily complicates the model. Instead, I gain tractability while maintaining
a preference for early resolution of uncertainty by employing Kreps and Porteus preferences.
Investors maximize their objective function subject to the following budget constraint
W0
i = Wi0Rf + X0
i( ˜ R − Rf ˜ P) (5)
where Wi0 is the initial wealth of agent i, Xi =( xi,1,x i,2)0 is the asset holdings vector of agent
i, ˜ R is the vector of risky asset payoﬀsa n d ˜ P is the price vector of the risky assets. The
market clearing conditions are given by
R 1
0 Xidi = ˜ Z.
2.4 Timing
In period one, investors choose Ci and Σi by maximizing the utility function in (3) or (4)
subject to the information processing constraint in (2) and rational expectations about Xi.
In period two, investors incorporate the information about asset payoﬀsf r o mt h e i ro p t i m a l l y
6Ex post Gaussian uncertainty is typically optimal when the associated optimization problem is linear-
quadratic. Here Gaussian uncertainty is assumed for tractability.
7A preference for early resolution of uncertainty is expressed with a convex aggregator over the expected
utility. I use the following convex transformation in order to obtain closed form solutions f(x)=−ln(−x)









| ˜ Yi, ˜ P
l
.
8chosen private signal, ˜ Yi, and the price, ˜ P, into their beliefs through Bayesian updating.
Finally, given their posterior beliefs about asset payoﬀs, investors decide the optimal asset
holdings, Xi, by maximizing the expected utility subject to the budget constraint in (5).
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
The model is solved using backward induction. First, given an arbitrary attention allocation,
each agent decides the optimal asset holdings. Second, given the optimal risky asset demand
as a function of each attention allocation, each agent chooses the optimal attention allocation.
3.1 Optimal asset holdings
In the second period, each agent chooses the optimal risky asset demand taking as given the
private signal. After observing the private signal and the asset prices, investors derive their
posterior beliefs about the payoﬀs in order to choose their optimal asset holdings
Xi
³





˜ R − Rf ˜ P | ˜ Yi, ˜ P
i
where
Vi = Va r
h










The linear rational expectations equilibrium price is found by aggregating these asset demands
and imposing the market clearing conditions.
Proposition 1 For a given signal choice by the investors, there exists a unique linear rational
expectations equilibrium price vector.
A mean-variance objective function implies a linear demand for risky assets, which does
not depend on wealth. If agents only faced the asset holdings decision given exogenous and
independent private signals, then prices and holdings of both assets would be uncorrelated.
93.2 Attention allocation
In the ﬁrst period, each agent chooses the optimal attention allocation by maximizing her ob-
jective function taking into account the optimal asset demand. The following lemma expresses
the ﬁrst period objective function.











i Q − I
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+ ¯ Re0V −1
i ¯ Reª
(7)
where I is the identity matrix, Tr(·) is the trace of a matrix, Vi is given by (6) and ¯ Re and Q
are respectively given by
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¢−1 ¯ Z (8)
and
Q = Va r
³
˜ R − Rf ˜ P
´
Investors choose the matrix of weights, Ci, and the variance-covariance matrix of the error
term, Σi, in the private signal (1) by maximizing the utility function given by (7) subject to
the information processing constraint given by (2). The following lemma shows that investors
choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoﬀs as a private signal.
Lemma 2 In the ﬁrst period, each investor allocates all of the limited information processing
capacity to learn about one linear combination of asset payoﬀs.
Lemma 2 shows that for any matrix of weights, investors choose to learn about one linear
combination of asset payoﬀs. Because investors are indiﬀerent between observing a speciﬁc
linear combination with either one or two private signals, I normalize the matrix of weights
Ci to be a 1 × 2 matrix such that Ci =( c1i,c 2i). This implies in particular that Σ−1
i is a
scalar. Hence, investors receive a private signal of the following form ˜ Yi = c1i˜ r1 + c2i˜ r2 +˜ εi.
The private signal contains more information about the ﬁrst asset the higher the variance of
10the ﬁrst term, c2
1iσ2
r1, and it contains more information about the second asset the higher the
variance of the second term, c2
2iσ2
r2.B e c a u s ei n v e s t o r so n l yc a r ea b o u tt h er e l a t i v ew e i g h tt h a t
each asset has in the private signal, I also normalize the weight of the ﬁr s ta s s e ti nt h ep r i v a t e
signal c1i to 1. The matrix of weights is then Ci =( 1 ,c 2i), and the investor’s decision problem
is reduced to choosing the optimal relative weight of each asset in the private signal, c2i.
The next proposition provides a parameter condition under which a unique linear symmetric
rational expectations equilibrium exists and solves for the equilibrium values of c2i and Σi.I n
the statement, ¯ re+
1 , ¯ re+
2 and Q+
12 are functions of exogenous parameters and are deﬁn e di nt h e
appendix.





12 ≥ 0 (9)
In this equilibrium, all investors allocate all their information processing capacity to learn
about a unique linear combination of asset payoﬀs, C =( 1 ,c ∗










































Proposition 2 solves the attention allocation problem. There is a unique linear rational
expectations equilibrium within the class of symmetric equilibria if and only if condition (9)
is satisﬁed. This condition depends only on exogenous parameters. In equilibrium, Q+
12 is the
covariance between the excess returns of both assets, ¯ re+
1 and ¯ re+
2 are the expected values of the
excess returns. Consequently, condition (9) restricts the equilibrium covariance between excess
returns of the two assets from being too negative. This parameter restriction is satisﬁed when
11the uncertainty in the economy is high relative to the level of risk tolerance and the amount
of information that investors are able to process.
In this symmetric equilibrium, all investors choose to observe a linear combination of two
asset payoﬀs as a private signal. Intuitively, given their expected investment strategy in the
next period, which is to hold a diversiﬁed portfolio, the relevant information is about a linear
combination of assets.8 One special feature of this equilibrium is that the weight of the second
asset in the private signal is independent of the investors’ information capacity, κ,a n dt h e
investors’ risk tolerance, ρ.
In this model, for some parameter values, there can be asymmetric equilibria.9 The next
proposition shows that in any equilibrium, at least a positive fraction of investors chooses a
private signal to learn about the two assets in the economy.
Proposition 3 In any equilibrium, a positive measure of investors chooses to learn about the
two asset payoﬀs using only one linear combination as a private signal.
Proposition 3 implies, in particular, that an equilibrium where agents specialize in process-
ing information about one asset or the other does not exist unlike in Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp [25,26]. In their model, if risky assets are uncorrelated, a fraction of investors al-
locates all of their attention to the ﬁrst asset and the remaining fraction of the agents pay
attention only to the second asset. In their setup, increasing returns to information dominates
diversiﬁcation. In contrast, here, by introducing the more general form of private signals
in (1), investors are able to exploit both increasing returns to information processing and
diversiﬁcation.
8In the additional appendix, I show that if investors are not able to process information from prices as in
Peng and Xiong [20], then there exists a symmetric equilibrium where investors allocate all the information
processing capacity to observe a private signal about the payoﬀ of their expected portfolio. The optimal private
signal in that case is given by ˜ Yi =˜ r1 +
¯ z2
¯ z1 ˜ r2 +˜ εi, which is equivalent, as shown in the proof of Lemma 2, to a
signal about the payoﬀ of the expected portfolio given by ˜ Y
∗
i =¯ z1 ˜ Yi =¯ z1˜ r1 +¯ z2˜ r2 +˜ ε
∗
i. However, if investors
are able to process information from prices, the private signal is not exactly about the payoﬀ of the expected
portfolio. The reason is that, although investors care about the payoﬀ of their expected portfolio, they choose
a private signal taking into account the information they expect to learn from prices. Note that the expected
portfolio is the expected supply, E (Xi)= ¯ Z.T h ep a y o ﬀ of the expected portfolio is given by ¯ Z
0 ˜ R =¯ z1˜ r1+¯ z2˜ r2.
9In numerical simulations, for a wide range of parameters, I have been only able to construct asymmetric






12 < 0. See the additional appendix for more details on asymmetric equilibria.
123.3 Discussion
The model presented has two formal diﬀerences relative to Van Nieuwerburgh and Veld-
kamp [26].
First, investors can choose a non-diagonal matrix of weights Ci in the private signal in (1).
In Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [25,26], as in Peng [19], Peng and Xiong [20], the matrix
of weights in the private signal Ci i st h ei d e n t i t ym a t r i x . I nt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h er i s k y
assets are ex-ante independent, they assume independence of uncertainty across assets ex-
post, which means that investors collect separately information about each asset. In other
words, they constrain the ex-post variance-covariance matrix of the payoﬀs to be diagonal,
which means that independent sources of ex-ante uncertainty remain independent ex-post.
Their assumption implies that an agent collects information one asset at a time, so that the
only way to reduce uncertainty on a broad portfolio is to reduce variance on each asset, leaving
the assets conditionally independent after the information collection. However, in this model,
Ci is optimally chosen by investors. In other words, investors optimally ﬁnd the form of the
conditional variance-covariance matrix of the payoﬀs, which is not initially constrained to be
diagonal. For the case of two independent assets, according to Proposition 3, it is optimal at
least for some investors to choose as a signal a weighted sum of asset payoﬀs instead of only
receiving a signal about each asset. Also, according to Proposition 2, there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in which all investors choose to observe a linear combination of the two assets in
the economy as a private signal.
Second, asset prices do not appear in the information ﬂow constraint. The information














is the entropy of the asset payoﬀs. In this information processing constraint,
investors use information capacity when processing information from prices. However, in my
model, investors do not use information capacity when getting information from prices as in
Peng [19], Peng and Xiong [20]. Nevertheless, the diﬀerence in the information ﬂow constraints
13plays no role in the diﬀerent implications of the model with respect to Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp [26].10 In my model, there exists a symmetric equilibrium where all investors opti-
mally devote all their attention to process information about the linear combination of asset
payoﬀs given by (10) if the information processing constraint is that used by Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp [26], given by (12).
4 Implications for comovement of asset prices
This section studies the implications of the linear symmetric equilibrium deﬁned by (10) and
(11) for stock price comovement of seemingly unrelated assets. In what follows, I describe the
intuition behind the potential comovement. Investors choose to observe a linear combination
of asset payoﬀs as a private signal. If they observe a high realization of the private signal,
they attribute part of the eﬀect to the ﬁrst asset and the rest to the second asset. For a given
of asset supply, a high realization of the private signal leads to an increase in the price of both
assets and price comovement of seemingly unrelated assets. This is formalized in the following
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (9) holds. Then in the linear symmetric equilibrium, for a
given realization of asset supplies, ˜ Z, there is comovement of asset prices Cov
³
˜ P1, ˜ P2 | ˜ Z
´
> 0.
Although there is comovement of asset prices for a given asset supply according to Propo-
sition 4, I obtain a similar unconditional result in Proposition 5 only under a parameter
restriction.




















Then in the linear symmetric equilibrium, there is unconditional comovement of asset prices,
Cov
³
˜ P1, ˜ P2
´
> 0.
10See the additional appendix for details.
14According to the parameter restriction in Proposition 5, if investors’ level of risk tolerance
is high relative to the uncertainty in the economy, then there is stock price comovement.11
As argued above, an increase in the realization of one of the asset payoﬀs, increases both
prices, yielding a positive covariance of asset prices. However, if this parameter restriction in
Proposition 5 is violated, then an increase in the realization of one of the asset supplies may
lead to a negative covariance of asset prices.
5 Transmission of volatility shocks to asset prices
This section studies whether the linear symmetric equilibrium deﬁned by (10) and (11) oﬀers
an explanation for the transmission of volatility shocks in one asset to the prices of other
seemingly unrelated assets. Intuitively, an unexpected event that raises the uncertainty of
one asset (i) may increase the attention allocated to this asset, (ii) may raise the posterior
uncertainty of the other uncorrelated asset through attention reallocation and thus (iii) may
lead to a stock price decline of the other asset.
In the linear symmetric equilibrium, investors choose to receive a private signal of the
following form ˜ Yi =˜ r1 + c∗
2˜ r2 +˜ εi. The private signal contains more information about the
ﬁrst asset the higher the variance of the ﬁrst term, σ2
r1, and it contains more information about
the second asset the higher the variance of the second term, c∗2
2 σ2
r2. Therefore, I measure the






. Proposition 6 formalizes the intuitive argument (i) above by summarizing the impact
of the assets’ payoﬀ and supply volatilities on investors’ attention allocation.
Proposition 6 Suppose condition (9) holds. Then in the linear symmetric equilibrium, the
relative attention allocated to asset j =1 ,2 increases with its payoﬀ volatility, σ2
rj,a n ds u p p l y
volatility, σ2
zj.
Investors allocate more attention to an asset the higher is its payoﬀ or supply volatility
and the lower is the payoﬀ or supply volatility of the other asset. For expositional purposes,
11In the additional appendix, I show using numerical simulations that excess comovement of asset prices
exists even in the presence of asymmetric equilibria.
15in what follows I focus on the second asset. The attention reallocation response to an increase
in the uncertainty of the second asset payoﬀ c a nb ed e c o m p o s e di nt w oe ﬀects: a direct eﬀect,
which is given by an increase in the prior variance of the second asset, σ2
r2; and second, an
indirect eﬀect, which is given by an increase in the weight of the second asset in the private
signal, c∗
2.B o t h e ﬀects generate an increase in the attention allocated to the second asset.
I nt h ed i r e c te ﬀect, for a given weight of the second asset c∗
2, the private signal now provides
more information about the second asset. The reason is that the private signal contains more
information about the second asset the higher the variance of the second term, c∗2
2 σ2
r2.I nt h e
indirect eﬀect, when there is an increase in prior variance of the second asset, σ2
r2, investors





> 0. This increases the




Proposition 6 provides a testable implication for attention allocation: a variable that
captures the information processed about a given industry should be higher in industries with
a higher uncertainty about fundamentals. Another way to test the implication for attention
allocation of Proposition 6 is by analyzing if an unexpected event that raises the uncertainty
of one asset leads to a decrease in the information processed about other unrelated assets.
According to Proposition 6, an unexpected event that raises the uncertainty of the second
asset decreases the attention allocated to the ﬁrst asset. Proposition 7 formalizes the intuitive
argument (ii) above by showing that this decrease in the attention allocated to the ﬁrst asset
may lead to an increase in the posterior uncertainty of the ﬁrst asset:
Proposition 7 Suppose condition (9) holds and that either
σ2
z2σ2










Then in the linear symmetric equilibrium, an increase in the variance of the second asset leads
16to an increase in the posterior variance of the ﬁrst asset.
The increase in the variance of the second asset spreads to the ﬁrst asset through attention
reallocation when one of the parameter restrictions in (13) or (14) is satisﬁed. If none of the
parameter conditions is satisﬁed, it is possible that an increase in the variance in the second
asset leads to a decrease in the conditional variance of the ﬁrst asset due to the information
content of prices.
To explain the intuition of this proposition, I decompose the attention reallocation eﬀect
in two pieces: ﬁrst, an increase in the prior variance of the second asset, σ2
r2, and second,
an increase in the weight of the second asset in the private signal, c∗
2.A c c o r d i n gt ot h eﬁrst
piece of the attention reallocation eﬀect, if there is an increase in the variance of the second
asset, then the signal, ˜ Yi, provides less information about the ﬁrst asset. This ﬁrst piece of
the attention reallocation eﬀect, which abstracts from any change of the weights in the private
signal, c∗
2, leads to an increase in the conditional variance of the ﬁrst asset, Va r
h
˜ r1 | ˜ Yi, ˜ P
i
without requiring any parameter restrictions.
The second piece of the attention reallocation eﬀect is the change in the weights of the
private signal. An increase in the variance of the second asset leads to an increase in the weight
of the second asset in the private signal. Therefore, the signal provides less information about
the ﬁrst asset. The key to understand the possibility of a decrease in the posterior variance of
the ﬁrst asset is that a change in the weights of the private signal also changes the way investors
learn from prices. If neither (13) nor (14) are satisﬁed, it is possible that the reduction in
information processed about the ﬁrst asset through the private signal is dominated by the
increase in information processed about this ﬁrst asset by asset prices, leading to a decrease
in the posterior variance of the ﬁrst asset.
Proposition 7 provides a testable implication for the perceived volatility of investors: if
(13) or (14) hold, an increase in the attention allocated to one asset leads to an increase in
the perceived volatility of other unrelated assets.
According to Proposition 7 an unexpected event that raises the uncertainty of the second
asset raises the posterior uncertainty of the ﬁrst asset through attention reallocation under
17the parameter condition (14). Proposition 8 formalizes the intuitive argument (iii) above by
showing that under the same parameter restriction, such unexpected event also leads to a
stock price decline of the ﬁrst asset.
Proposition 8 If conditions (9) and (14) hold, then in the linear symmetric equilibrium, an
increase in the variance of the second asset leads to a decrease in the expected price of the ﬁrst
asset.
If the parameter restriction (14) is satisﬁed and there is an increase in the uncertainty of
the second asset, then there is an increase in the attention allocated to this asset, and the
concurrent decrease in the attention allocated to the ﬁrst asset. This leads to an increase
of the posterior variance of the ﬁr s ta s s e ta n da ni n c r e a s ei ni t sr i s kp r e m i u m . H e n c e ,t h e
expected excess return of the ﬁrst asset increases and its expected price falls. If the parameter
restriction (14) is not satisﬁed, it is possible that an increase in the variance of one asset leads
to an increase in the expected price of the other asset.
6 Numerical analysis
This section conducts a numerical example with parameters chosen to reasonably match
yearly asset price moments for the U.S. stock market. I take my parameter values from
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [26]. Each asset payoﬀ has a standard deviation of prior
beliefs σr1 = σr2 = 15%,w h i c hr e ﬂects historical levels of payoﬀ volatility, and an expected
payoﬀ ¯ r1 =¯ r2 =1 . The mean of the asset payoﬀsd o e sn o ta ﬀect second moments. Each
asset has an expected net supply ¯ z1 =¯ z2 = 100 and a considerably high standard deviation
σz1 = σz2 =1 0for prices not to reveal too much information. The coeﬃcient of risk tolerance
is ρ =2 . The return of the riskless asset is 2%,s ot h a tRf =1 .02.12
Panel A in ﬁgure 1 shows that, as long as the information processing capacity, κ,i sh i g h e r
than zero, stock prices are correlated even though fundamentals are uncorrelated. In this ﬁgure
and for these particular parameter values, the higher the information capacity, the higher is
12These parameter values satisfy the conditions in Propositions 2, 5, 7 and 8.
18the level of correlation. Intuitively, if the information capacity is zero, no information is
processed and stocks are uncorrelated. However, if there is a positive information processing
capacity, then because the parameter restriction in Proposition 5 is satisﬁed, there is asset price
comovement. An information processing capacity κ =0 .4 implies an asset price correlation
of 21%. This asset price correlation predicted by the model is close to the average excess
correlation of 25.5% between the index returns of all major industry groups in the U.S. stock
market reported by Kallberg and Pasquariello [8].13
Panel B in ﬁgure 1 shows that if information capacity is held constant at κ =0 .4 and the
standard deviation of the prior beliefs in the second asset is increased to σr2 = 17%, then the
expected price of the second asset decreases by 11.2% and the expected price of the ﬁrst asset
decreases by 2.26%.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a rational expectations model of asset prices with information processing
constraints and explains asset price comovement and transmission of volatility shocks between
seemingly unrelated assets.
The model represents a step forward towards the introduction of rational inattention into
a general equilibrium ﬁnance model. Investors choose the composition of their information,
i.e., investors can process information about individual assets or linear combination of assets.
Unlike previous papers, where investors collect information about individual assets, investors
optimally decide the form of the conditional variance-covariance matrix of the asset payoﬀs,
which is not initially constrained to be diagonal. However, several assumptions should be
relaxed in order to have a general equilibrium model with rationally inattentive agents. The
model assumes that investors have Gaussian uncertainty about the random variable of interest,
in this case asset payoﬀs, ex-ante and ex-post. Sims [23] presents a methodology to ﬁnd the
nature of the ex-post uncertainty about the random variable of interest. Another assumption of
13Pasquariello and Vega [18] reported the correlation matrix of the earnings of all major industry groups
in the U.S. stock market and noted that the fundamentals of many industries in the U.S. stock market are
uncorrelated.
19the model is that rationally inattentive agents are able to freely observe prices, which means
that investors have an unbounded capacity to process information about prices. They are
also unable to process information about the random asset supply, so the cost of processing
information about the noisy asset supply is inﬁnite. A potential extension of the model is
to relax these two assumptions by having investors who observe prices with a measurement
error. Then, the noisy asset supply assumption can be dropped since prices are unobservable.
In this case, I conjecture that investors will not process information about prices or payoﬀs
individually, but the variable of interest for investors will be the asset excess returns. Hence,
investors, when deciding their asset holdings, will not pay attention to the price, but they will
process information about the asset excess returns.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Following Admati [1], one can show that there exists a unique linear rational expectations equilibrium







The price vector is given by
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8.2 Proof of Lemma 1
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i
20Deﬁne VER as the variance-covariance matrix of the conditional expected excess returns




˜ R − Rf ˜ P | ˜ Yi, ˜ P
i´
By standard results from statistics, if X and Y are arbitrary random variables for which the necessary
expectations and variances exist, then Va r(Y )=E [Va r(Y | X)] + Va r(E [Y | X]).U s i n g t h i s
result, the variance-covariance matrix of the conditional expected excess returns is given by












˜ R | ˜ Yi, ˜ P
´




2 − RfA1ΣR − RfΣRA0
1 − Vi
where Vi is given by (6). By standard results from statistics, if x =( x1,x 2,...,x n)0 ∼ N(μ,V ) and
q = x0Ax, then the expected value of q is E(q)=tr[AV ]+μ0Aμ. Using this result, the objective











i Q − I
¢
+ ¯ Re0V −1
i ¯ Reª
where I is the identity matrix, ¯ Re is given by (8) and Q is given by
Q = Va r
³
˜ R − Rf ˜ P
´




2 − RfA1ΣR − RfΣRA0
1 (17)
8.3 Proof of Lemma 2
I will follow three steps to show that each investor allocates all of the limited information processing
capacity to learn about one linear combination of asset payoﬀs. First, I will show that a normalization
of the variance-covariance matrix of the error term in the private signal, Σi, is required. Second, I will
show that a normalization of the matrix of weights, Ci, is required. Finally, I will solve the optimization
problem of an inﬁnitesimal investor.
Step1: Normalization of Σi





where Λi is a diagonal matrix and P0 = P−1, I will show that for every non-diagonal Σi, an equilibrium




i ˜ Yi = P−1
i Ci ˜ R + P−1
i ˜ εi = C∗
i ˜ R +˜ ε∗
i
where Va r(˜ ε∗
i)=Λi is a diagonal matrix.
First, I show that the new private signal satisﬁes the information capacity constraint. Mutual
Information is invariant to any invertible linear transformation of the random variables, which implies
I(X;Y )=I(X;P−1Y )=H (X) − H (X | Y ) ≤ κ
Second, in order to prove that an equilibrium with a private signal ˜ Yi is indistinguishable from an
21equilibrium with a private signal ˜ Y ∗
i , there is enough to show that C0
iΣ−1











i . More details are provided in Admati [1].
Therefore, for a given matrix of weights Ci, I let investors choose a normalized diagonal variance-









Step 2: Normalization of Ci
I will show that for every matrix of weights , Ci, and diagonal variance-covariance matrix of the
error term, Σi, an equilibrium with a private signal ˜ Yi is indistinguishable from an equilibrium with a
private signal ˜ Y ∗
i given by
˜ Y ∗
i = Γ˜ Yi = ΓCi ˜ R + Γ˜ εi = C∗
i ˜ R +˜ ε∗
i
where Γ is a diagonal non-singular matrix and Va r(˜ ε∗
i) is still a diagonal matrix.
First, I show that the new private signal satisﬁes the normalization of the variance-covariance
matrix of the error term in the private signal, Σi, from step 1. Because Γ is a diagonal matrix, then the
variance-covariance matrix of the new error term, ˜ ε∗
i = Γ˜ εi, is still diagonal and given byΓΣiΓ. Second,
as in step 1 of this proof, the new private signal satisﬁes the information capacity constraint. Finally, in
order to prove that an equilibrium with a private signal ˜ Yi is indistinguishable from an equilibrium with
a private signal ˜ Y ∗
i , there is enough to show that C0
iΣ−1
i Ci = C0
iΓ(ΓΣiΓ)




More details are provided in Admati [1].








Step 3: Optimization problem of an inﬁnitesimal investor.
According to steps 1 and 2, for a given normalized matrix of weights, Ci, given by (19), I can
let investors choose a normalized diagonal variance-covariance matrix of the error term in the private




































































































is a constant term
(20)
























where π11,π12 and π22 are each of the elements in the matrix Π given by (15), ¯ re
1 and ¯ re
2 are each of
22the elements of the expected excess returns vector ¯ Re given by (8) and Q11,Q 12 and Q22 are each of
the elements in the matrix Q given by (17). The investor when optimizing takes as given ¯ re
1, ¯ re
2,π 11,


















where ai1,a i2,b i1,b i2 and bi4 are strictly positive constants and bi3 ≥ 0.I ft h eﬁrst constraint, which








































Thus, the solution to the optimization problem is a corner solution and investors allocate all their
attention to one linear combination of asset payoﬀs. If bi3 =0 , then ci22 = ci12, the objective function
is independent of the choice variable and there is a continuum of solutions. Investors are indiﬀerent
between any two private signals with identical weights of the asset payoﬀs. This implies that investors
are indiﬀerent with any allocation of limited information capacity between the two signals. Therefore,
investors choose to learn about one linear combination of asset payoﬀs, but they can do so by observing
one or two private signals. In this case, when ci22 = ci12, I normalize the matrix of weights Ci to be
a 1 × 2 matrix, which implies that investors are restricted to observe one private signal.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 2
I will show that there is a unique linear symmetric rational expectations equilibrium if and only if
condition (9) holds. The proof proceeds in ﬁve steps. First, I will solve the optimization problem of
an inﬁnitesimal investor. In step 2, I will characterize all potential symmetric equilibria and show that
there are four candidates. In step 3, I will eliminate three of these symmetric candidates. In step 4, I




and solve for the equilibrium values of c2i and Σi. Finally, in step 5, I will conclude that there exists




Step 1: Solve the inﬁnitesimal agent’s optimization problem.












Following the proof of Lemma 2, I normalize the matrix of weights to be Ci =( 1 ,c 2i). Substituting



























where Ω is given by (20), ¯ re
1 and ¯ re
2 are given by (8) and Q11,Q 12 and Q22 are given by (17).
Inﬁnitesimal investors have no eﬀect on prices and take as given Ω, ¯ re
1, ¯ re
2,Q 11,Q 12 and Q22 when






























Step 1.1: Best response when (¯ re
1¯ re
2 + Q12) 6=0
I will show that the best response of an inﬁnitesimal investor when (¯ re
1¯ re



















































2 + Q12) 6=0 , the ﬁrst order condition (23) has two interior solutions. One is a local
maximum and one is a local minimum. The local maximum is given by (24). This is the reaction
function where investors take as given the aggregate variables of the economy. The relevant term in
the second order condition evaluated at c2i = c∗






















The other interior solution to the ﬁrst order condition is always a local minimum. The local maximum
c∗
2i given by (24) is a global maximum because the second order condition at this point is strictly
negative and the objective function is not maximized by setting c2i = ±∞.
Step 1.2: Best response when (¯ re
1¯ re
2 + Q12)=0 .
I will show that the best response of an inﬁnitesimal investor when (¯ re
1¯ re
2 + Q12)=0is given
by either c∗
2i = ±∞ or c∗















































































),t h e na ni n ﬁnitesimal in-
vestor is indiﬀerent between any c2i.
Step 2: There are four potential symmetric equilibria.
In any linear symmetric equilibrium all investors choose the same weight in the private signal
24c2i = c2. By substituting the values of ¯ re
1 and ¯ re
2 given by (8) and Q11,Q 12 and Q22 given by (17)
into the ﬁrst order condition given by (23) and imposing that all investors choose the same c2i = c2,I























































There are four values of c2 that satisfy (25). Thus, there are four potential candidates to a linear
symmetric equilibrium given by c2 = ±∞, c2 = c+































































In the following steps, I will use the following deﬁnitions and expressions. I deﬁne b ¯ re
1 and b ¯ re
2 as the
expressions of the expected excess returns given by (8) when all investors choose the same weight of
the second asset in the private signal c2i = c2.Ia l s od e ﬁne d Q11, d Q12 and d Q22 as the expressions for
the elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the excess returns given by (17) when all investors
choose the same weight of the second asset in the private signal c2i = c2. Finally, the expression for ³
b ¯ re
1 b ¯ re





1 b ¯ re





















1 b ¯ re
2 + d Q12
´
depends only on exogenous parameters and c2.
Step 3: Eliminate c2 = c−
2 and c2 = ±∞ as candidates to a symmetric equilibrium.
I will use the agent’s best response function to select a unique candidate, c2 = c+
2 ,f r o mt h es e to f
candidates identiﬁed in step 2.
Step 3.1: A symmetric equilibrium where c2 = c−
2 given by (27) does not exist.
In a symmetric equilibrium withc2 = c−
2 , becausec−
2 is strictly negative, the expression
³
b ¯ re
1 b ¯ re
2 + d Q12
´
given by (28) when all investors choose c2 = c−
2 is strictly positive. According to step 1.1, this implies
that the best response of the inﬁnitesimal investor, c∗
2i, is given by (24). Because
³
b ¯ re
1 b ¯ re
2 + d Q12
´
eval-
uated at c2 = c−
2 is strictly positive, c∗
2i is also strictly positive. This is a contradiction because c−
2
is a strictly negative expression. In an economy where all investors choose c2 = c−




Step 3.2: A symmetric equilibrium where c2 = ±∞ does not exist.
In a symmetric equilibrium with c2 = ±∞, all investors learn only about the second asset. Hence,
25in equilibrium π12 =0 , π11 > 0, π22 > 0,w h e r eπ11,π12 and π22 are each of the elements in the
matrix Π given by (15). This implies that the matrices A1 and A2 in the equilibrium price (16) are
diagonal. Hence, in equilibrium Q12 =0 ,w h e r eQ12 is the covariance of the excess returns given by
(17) and ¯ re
1 > 0, ¯ re
2 > 0,w h e r e¯ re
1 and ¯ re
2 are the expected excess returns given by (8). Because in
equilibrium (¯ re
1¯ re
2 + Q12) is strictly positive, according to step 1.1, the best response of the inﬁnitesimal
investor, c∗
2i,i sg i v e nb y( 2 4 ) ,w h i c hi sﬁnite. This is a contradiction. In an economy where all investors
choose c2 = ±∞,t h ei n ﬁnitesimal investor chooses c∗
2i 6= ±∞.
Step 4: If ¯ re+
1 ¯ re+
2 + Q+
12 ≥ 0, then there exists a unique linear symmetric rational expec-
tations equilibrium.
Iw i l ls h o wt h a tc2 = c+
2 is an equilibrium if ¯ re+
1 ¯ re+
2 +Q+
12 ≥ 0. According to step 3, c2 = c+
2 is the
only candidate to constitute a linear symmetric rational expectations equilibrium. Hence, if c2 = c+
2











1 b ¯ re
2 + d Q12
´
given by (28) evaluated at c2 = c+




can be positive and negative and it is fully determined by exogenous parameters.
Step 4.1: If ¯ re+
1 ¯ re+
2 + Q+





12 > 0.I n o r d e r t o p r o v e t h a t c2 = c+
2 constitutes a linear symmetric
equilibrium, I will show that the best response of an inﬁnitesimal investor when all investors choose
c2 = c+
2 is given by c∗
2i = c+




































1 and ¯ re+
1 are the expressions of the expected excess returns given by (8) when all investors




22 are the elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the excess
returns given by (17) when all investors choose c2i = c+
2 . Substituting the RHS of (29) into the best
response function given by (24), the revised reaction function if ¯ re+
1 ¯ re+
2 + Q+
12 > 0 and all investors
choose c2i = c+






























Substituting the expression for c+












































> 0,t h e nc+
2 is a ﬁxed point because c∗
2i = c+
2 . The optimal precision of the error









Step 4.2: If ¯ re+
1 ¯ re+
2 + Q+






















step 2, the ﬁrst order condition in (23) is always satisﬁed when all investors choose c2 = c+
2 and because
c+
2 is strictly positive. Consequently, according to step 1.2, the objective function given by (22) does




12 =0 ,t h e nc2 = c+
2 is a rational expectations equilibrium. The optimal precision of
the error term in the private signal is given by (31).





Assume c2 = c+
2 is a linear symmetric equilibrium when ¯ re+
1 ¯ re+
2 + Q+
12 < 0. Substituting the
RHS of the ﬁrst order condition when all investors choose c2 = c+
2 given by (29) into the best response
function given by (24), the revised reaction function if ¯ re+
1 ¯ re+
2 + Q+
12 < 0 and all investors choose
c2i = c+




























Substituting the expression for c+






































which is a contradiction because c∗
2i 6= c+
2 .T h u s , i f ¯ re+
1 ¯ re+
2 + Q+
12 < 0, then a linear symmetric
rational expectations equilibrium does not exist.




12 ≥ 0. In this equilibrium, all investors allocate their information processing capacity to
learn about a unique linear combination of asset payoﬀs where the weight of the second asset is given
by (10) and the variance of the error term is given by (11). For expositional purposes, in the main text
of the paper, I use c2 = c∗
2 to refer to the linear symmetric equilibrium c2 = c+
2 .
8.5 Proof of Proposition 3
I will show that an equilibrium where all investors specialize in learning does not exist. Proposition 2
shows that a symmetric equilibrium where all investors specialize in learning about one asset does
not exist. In what follows, I will show that for any λ such that 1 >λ>0, there does not exist an
asymmetric equilibrium where a fraction λ of investors learns only about the ﬁrst asset, Cλ =( 1 ,0)
and chooses Σλ and a fraction (1 − λ) of investors learns only about the second asset, C1−λ =( 1 ,∞)
and chooses Σ1−λ. Assume such an equilibrium exists. Hence, the inﬁnitesimal investor is indiﬀerent
between choosing (Cλ,Σλ) and (C1−λ,Σ1−λ). The objective function given by (22) provides the same
















Furthermore, in this economy, because investor’s private information is about only one asset, in
27equilibrium π12 =0 , π11 > 0, π22 > 0 where π11,π12 and π22 are each of the elements in the matrix
Π given by (15). This implies that the matrices A1 and A2 in the equilibrium price (16) are diagonal.
Hence, in equilibrium Q12 =0 ,w h e r eQ12 is the covariance of the excess returns given by (17) and
¯ re
1 > 0, ¯ re
2 > 0,w h e r e¯ re
1 and ¯ re
2 are the expected excess returns given by (8). Thus, in equilibrium,
¯ re
1¯ re









This leads to a contradiction because the inﬁnitesimal investor wants to deviate from specialization.
Therefore, an equilibrium where all investors specialize in learning does not exist.
8.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The covariance of asset prices conditional on the asset supplies, ˜ Z, is given by the element (1,2) of the
conditional variance-covariance matrix of asset prices
Va r
³








22 as each of the elements in the matrix Π given by (15) when all investors choose
the same weight of the second asset in the private signal, c2i = c∗
























2 and Σ∗ are deﬁned in (10) and (11) respectively and are functions of only exogenous parame-
ters. The conditional covariance of the asset prices in the linear symmetric equilibrium, Cov∗
³
˜ P1, ˜ P2 | ˜ Z
´
,
can be expressed as
Cov∗
³

































































˜ P1, ˜ P2 | ˜ Z
´
depends only on exogenous parameters and is a strictly positive expression.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 5
The unconditional covariance of asset prices is given by the element (1,2) of the variance-covariance








where the expressions for A1 and A2 are given in the proof of Proposition 1 in the section 8.1 of
the appendix. The unconditional covariance of asset prices can also be expressed in terms of the
28conditional covariance as Cov
³
















˜ P2 | ˜ Z
i´
.
The unconditional covariance of the asset prices in the linear symmetric equilibrium, Cov∗
³
˜ P1, ˜ P2
´
,
can be expressed as
Cov∗
³




































where Ψ is given by (34), π∗































































































































































































then the unconditional covariance of asset prices is strictly positive because θ1,θ2,θ3,θ4 are strictly





















8.8 Proof of Proposition 6







, is strictly increasing in its payoﬀ volatility, σ2
r2, and supply volatility, σ2
z2.I t i s










> 0. The weight of the second asset in the private signal is





































































See the additional appendix for additional details on the derivation of this result. The weight of the






























































,i ss t r i c t l y
increasing in its payoﬀ volatility, σ2
r1, and supply volatility, σ2
z1.
8.9 Proof of Proposition 7
I will show that the posterior variance of the ﬁrst asset in the linear symmetric equilibrium, Va r ∗
h
˜ r1 | ˜ Yi, ˜ P
i
,
is increasing in the prior variance of the second asset, σ2
r2, under a parameter condition. The posterior















where Ψ is given by (34). The posterior variance of the ﬁr s ta s s e ti sg i v e nb y
Va r ∗
h














































In order to prove that
∂Var∗[˜ r1|˜ Yi, ˜ P]
∂σ2
r2






























































































0. Similarly, one can show that the posterior variance of the second asset is increasing with the prior
variance of the ﬁrst asset if σ2
z1σ2








308.10 Proof of Proposition 8
I will show that the expected price of the ﬁrst asset in the linear symmetric equilibrium, ¯ p+
1 , is decreasing
in the prior variance of the second asset, σ2
r2, under a parameter condition. Expected asset prices can be
written as ¯ p1 =( ¯ r1 − ¯ re
1)/Rf and ¯ p2 =( ¯ r2 − ¯ re




































































where expressions for π∗
11,π∗
12 and π∗
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< 0. Similarly, one can show that the expected
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Expected Price Change Asset 1
Expected Price Change Asset 2
Figure1: Panel A shows the price correlation of the ﬁrst and second asset for several values of information
processing capacity, κ. Panel B shows the percentage change of expected asset prices for several values of the
standard deviation of the second asset with respect to the benchmark (σr2 =0 .15). The parameter values
are the following σr1 =0 .15, ¯ r1 =¯ r2 =1 ,σ z1 = σz2 =1 0 , ¯ z1 =¯ z2 = 100,ρ=2 ,κ=0 .4.
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